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over time is lacking. This is limiting a detailed understanding of how organizations respond to cri-
ses. The ﬁndings, based on a longitudinal analysis of cognitive maps within three managementWhen facing a crisis, leaders' sensemaking can take a considerable amount of time due to the need
to develop consensus in how to deal with it so that vision formation and sensegiving can take
place. However, research into emerging cognitive consensus when leaders deal with a crisis
teams at a single organization, highlight considerable individual differences in cognitive content
when starting to make sense of a crisis. Evidence for an emerging viable prescriptive mental
model for the future was found, but not somuch in themanagement as awhole. Instead, the ﬁnd-
ings highlight increasing cognitive consensus based on similarities in objectives and cause–effect
beliefs within well-deﬁned management teams over time.






Due to its importance to the viability of organizations, the link between perceptions and interpretations of external change and
organizational adaptation to achieve performance outcomes has received considerable research attention (Barr, 1998; Barr,
Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Daft & Weick, 1984; Eden & Ackermann, 2010; Isabella, 1990; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Sutcliffe &
Huber, 1998; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). A major reason given for organizational adaptation in the face of a disruptive external
change and subsequent crisis is that leaders alter their beliefs to accommodate the changes in the environment, or alternatively,
the leaders themselves are changed (Barr, 1998; Daft & Weick, 1984; Janis, 1989).
Leaders are clearly important when organizations face a crisis and are key when searching for answers to make sense of what is
happening (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Sensemaking under crises is inherently complex because leaders have to think and
problem solve in the context of a novel ambiguous situation involving time pressure and stress while interactingwith others in man-
agement teams (Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007). The key task for leaders in such situations is to develop a mental
model, based on their schemas,1 consisting of causal beliefs for understanding and responding to the crisis (Weick, 1995).ratures and seem to be sometimes used synonymously. For example, the term ‘mental models’ is popular (e.g
90) as are the terms ‘cognitive models’ (e.g. Hodgkinson, 1997) and ‘schemas’ (e.g. Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Fiske
; Lord& Foti, 1986) and ‘mental representations’ (Stubbart, 1989). All these terms are used to describe the cognitive
g and other management processes and activities. The terms ‘belief structures’ (Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch,
992;Walsh, 1995) are also found in the literatures but these terms are sometimes used at a group level of analysis
s or an organization. The term ‘cognitivemap’ (e.g. Axelrod, 1976; Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994; Daft &Weick,
m is oftenmore closely associatedwith a visual representation of cognition, such as a representation on paper
epresentational form in this article. Debates on the problems raised by the multiple terms used highlight that
they should not be used synonymously. For example, mental models can be thought of as temporary dynamic
ring knowledge structures in long term memory (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Rouse & Morris, 1986).
nc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Mumford et al. (2007) present a detailed theoretically grounded conceptual model, which includes two particularly important facets,
both central to their conceptual model of leader cognition. One, is the activation of descriptive mental models which are used to in-
terpret any externally led change. It is external change that invariably starts a crisis and individual managers adopting leadership
roles, evenwithin the same ﬁrm, can interpret the change differently (Jackson&Dutton, 1988). Two, is the development of a prescrip-
tivementalmodel or “…amentalmodel describing the causes and consequences of performancewith respect to the crisis situation at
hand” (Mumford et al., 2007, p. 528). In other words, leaders develop a mental template for the future, but as Mumford et al. (2007)
point out, this development is complex and occurs over time. The development of a new prescriptive mental model is critical because
the stability of leaders' cognition in the face of a changing external environment has been found to be a contributor to inertia and or-
ganizational failure (Barr et al., 1992; Hodgkinson, 1997).
As an understanding of descriptive mental models and the development of a prescriptive mental model for the future are both
cited as key to fully understand leaders' sensemaking under crises, a longitudinal research perspective is required. Sensemaking
under crises involves cycles of information processing, communication and problem solving, which are likely to be interspersed
with action, tomake sense and givemeaning to events (Smircich&Morgan, 1982;Weick et al., 2005). Inmost settings such a complex
longitudinal process invariably involves collective leadership drawing on different experiences and expertise within management
teams (Friedrich, Vessey, Schuelke, Ruark, & Mumford, 2009). While individuals within management teams will likely interpret
change differently, ultimately, consensus needs to be built around an envisioned future (Strange & Mumford, 2002).
The development of a viable prescriptivemental model provides a basis for vision formation in a crisis (Mumford & Strange, 2002;
Strange & Mumford, 2005). However, we know little of how the content, or the assumptions and beliefs, contained within leaders'
mental models develop and change during the course of a crisis. With the exception of an empirical study by Markóczy (2001)
there is little direct cognitive empirical evidence to help understand how consensus is developed over timewithin thementalmodels
of individual managers within the same ﬁrm as they grapple with the same change events. To help understand how leaders develop a
prescriptive mental model for the future when responding to a crisis, we map cognitive diversity and consensus in individuals
adopting leadership roles within management teams in the same ﬁrm over time.
Sensemaking
As part of a growing stream of research into management cognition (see Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Hodgkinson & Sparrow,
2002; Narayanan, Zane, & Kemmerer, 2011; Walsh, 1995 for reviews) scholars have long considered the importance of sensemaking
based on interpretive work conducted by the leaders of organizations, such as the CEO or top management team, to make sense of
change when it is encountered (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Weick (1995, p. 57) points out that the sensemaking perspective is asso-
ciated with understanding the cognitive ﬁlters that people use and what these ﬁlters include and exclude. Thus, a hallmark of
sensemaking is the simpliﬁcation of complexity through individuals' mental models so as not to be overwhelmed by data (Daft &
Weick, 1984; Walsh, 1988).
Leaders enact or produce part of the environment they face (Daft &Weick, 1984;Weick, 1995) such as the enactment of a strategic
group within their mental models signifying a very limited perception of competition (Porac, Thomas, & Baden‐Fuller, 1989). Conse-
quently, the sensemaking perspective highlights that the environments that leaders deal with are, at least in part, socially constructed
(Weick, 1995). This social construction of environments distinguishes the sensemaking perspective frommuch of thework on behav-
ioral economics, such as the work which focuses on the cognitive limitations of humans in general operating in objective environ-
ments (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Weick, 1995). While the social aspects of sensemaking is a theme running through the
literature, some researchers put more emphasis on sensemaking as an individual cognitive process (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).
Another theme debatedwithin the literature on sensemaking is in connectionwith its temporal dimension.Weick (1995) initially
highlighted the retrospective nature of sensemaking, while more recent work raises the possibility of prospective future oriented
sensemaking that may be linked to resolving a crisis (Weick et al., 2005). Leaders can make presumptions about the future (Weick
et al., 2005) and give meaning to others (Smircich & Morgan, 1982) such as through categorizing and labeling a disruptive change
as an ‘opportunity’ signifying a positive way to deal with change (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). The communication of meaning, such
as through the labeling of a disruptive change by trusted leaders is likely to result in more consensus which in turn is more likely
to result in organizational action (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Schwenk, 1984).
Leaders' sensemaking under crises
While a strict deﬁnition to encompass all crises is problematic, they are often associated with sudden threats to high priority goals
and the need to dramatically change prior practice (Hunt, Osborn, & Boal, 2009). Crises involve a movement away from stability to
established new goals (Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009) and also imply a time pressured change relative to standard operating proce-
dures (Mumford et al., 2007; Williams, Pillai, Deptula, & Lowe, 2012).
Sensemaking within an organizational change process is related to understanding and is cognitive in nature (Gioia & Chittipeddi,
1991). In the leadership literature, research has highlighted the importance of context speciﬁc cognition, which underpins
sensemaking and leaders' behavior as well as its inﬂuence on outcomes such as performance (Antes & Mumford, 2012; Barrett,
Vessey, &Mumford, 2011; Lord & Hall, 2005; Mumford, Connelly, & Gaddis, 2003;Mumford et al., 2007). Leaders are critically impor-
tant in the context of sensemaking under crises. They are bombarded with a stream of often conﬂicting data associated with ill-
deﬁned events and possible problems (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). It is their key role tomake sense of this critical situation and to convey
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oping a resolution to any crisis. They need to project a vision to overcome a crisis based on their prescriptive mental model or mental
template for the future (Mumford et al., 2007).
While the leadership role in sensemaking under crises is critical, leaders are likely to face twomain types of problems common in
organizations, which add to the difﬁculty of the task: ambiguity and uncertainty (Weick, 1995). Ambiguous facets of crises are likely to
result in too many interpretations, while uncertain facets are likely to result in no interpretations as leaders are ignorant of what is
happening (Weick, 1995). Events incorporating both ambiguity and uncertainty are likely to emerge over time when under a crisis
(Mumford et al., 2007). Leaders should not act alone when confronting such difﬁcult events. Rather they should work in teams be-
cause having different perspectives can enrich interpretations (Huber & Lewis, 2010).
When operating in management teams, leaders are likely to share perceptions and gradually create meaning through communi-
cation so there is cross understanding (Huber & Lewis, 2010). Cross understanding, through an accurate understanding of themental
models of others within a leadership team, may lead to changes to mental models because some individuals are convinced by and
adopt the beliefs of others (Huber & Lewis, 2010). Such cross understandings are therefore likely to add to consensus.
While cross understanding may facilitate more accurate interpretations of events associated with a crisis, errors of judgment are
also likely to occur. Prior research suggests that leaders putmuch reliance on case-based prior knowledge and experiencewhen think-
ing but this can result in errors especially when addressing complex ill-deﬁned problems that are likely to be encountered in crises
(Eubanks & Mumford, 2010; Mumford et al., 2007). Such errors are also likely to limit leaders' creative thinking required to resolve
a crisis (Mumford, Blair, Dailey, Leritz, & Osburn, 2006). A number of errors are likely in leaders' cognition, such as those linked to
humans' limited information processing capacity (Cyert & March, 1963; Lord & Maher, 1990; Miller, 1956), and others more speciﬁc
to sensemaking under crises. Mumford et al. (2007) discuss that dealing with crises make speciﬁc demands on leaders that are likely
to result in a number of errors. The authors point to errors such as non-recognition of change; errors due to time stress and resource
demands; underestimates of the response required due to a form of anchoring bias; and the nature of prior knowledge and the use of
speciﬁc prototypical cases whichmay not be appropriate for applying to the current crisis. Clearly, to achieve performance in dealing
with crises leaders have to reduce such errors. One major way they can reduce errors is by involving others with different ways of
thinking in collective leadership and decision making.
Cognitive diversity and consensus within leadership teams
When confronting disruptive external change and crises, not all those adopting leadership roles are likely to think the same, even
within the same ﬁrm. As previously observed, differencesmay be due to errors, such as focal errors, because leaders focus on different
information or use different case based prior knowledge. Alternatively, some leadersmay takemore time than others to think through
the issues.
Cognitive diversity and consensus in leaders refers to thedifferences and similarities in beliefswithin theirmentalmodels.Muchof
the prior research is directed at strategic consensus or the shared understanding on a common set of priorities (Floyd &Wooldridge,
1992). In such studies it is usual to consider consensus in terms of the content of mental models, in particular the ends (objectives,
goals) and means (strategies) used to achieve them in top management teams (Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner, & Floyd, 2005).2
While the study of ends and means are clearly important to understanding sensemaking under crises, Markóczy (2001) suggests
that this focus may limit a more holistic investigation. Consequently, there is a need to focus on the beliefs associated with the issues
most relevant to leaders and how these beliefs are related (Markóczy, 2001).
In the decision making literature consensus and its implications for performance have been studied considerably but with incon-
clusive results (see Kellermanns et al., 2005, for a review). It is perhaps not surprising then, that prior research is not unequivocal as to
themerits of consensus in leaders. Research highlights problemswhen leaders think in similar ways, such as underestimating the full
extent of competition (e.g. Porac et al., 1989) so cognitive diversitymay help eliminate bias and errors of judgment. Cognitive diversity
in teams is also likely to increase creativity (Kilduff, Angelmar, &Mehra, 2000; Shin, Kim, Lee, & Bian, 2012) and is said to lead tomore
extensive discussions about strategic options to enable ﬁrms to change (Lant et al., 1992; Miller, Burke, & Glick, 1998). Differences in
thinking are reported to increase the range of vision so that promising options are not missed (Eden & Ackermann, 2010). Such
differences are more likely when leadership occurs via large management teams (Amason & Sapienza, 1997), incorporating individ-
uals fromdifferent cultural backgrounds (Hitt, Dacin, Tyler, & Park, 1997) and various hierarchical levels (Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, Porras, &
Auld, 1987).
On the other hand, researchers also report positive outcomes for management consensus relating to external change. Waiting for
consensus to emerge can slow down decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989) but consensus itself has been found to subsequently posi-
tively inﬂuence the speed of decisionmaking and action (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Dess, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989). Cognitive con-
sensus is also likely to be helpful when undertaking idea evaluation which is a key task for leaders (Mumford, Marks, Connelly,
Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000; Mumford et al., 2003). It is also postulated to be important for shared commitment within manage-
ment teams (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Markóczy, 2001; Schwenk, 1986) and therefore important for responding to a crisis.
While both cognitive diversity and consensus in managers adopting leadership roles are reported to have positive outcomes
for ﬁrms, there is relatively less research emphasis placed on investigating these at an individual level rather than the ﬁrm level of
analysis (see the following for exceptions, Hitt et al., 1997; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; Hodgkinson & Maule, 2002; Ireland et al.,2 It is worth noting that much research in this decisionmaking domain has used proxies for cognition such as topmanagement team demographics rather than cog-
nition itself (see Markóczy, 1997).
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dividual level of analysis in a single ﬁrm to help throw light on leaders' sensemaking over time when dealing with a crisis (Friedrich
et al., 2009).While there is limited prior empirical research into individual differences inmanagement cognitionwithin the same ﬁrm
as they deal with a crisis, longitudinal empirical research on stability and change to individual manager's cognition in this context is
even more limited.
Stability and change to mental models under crises
Researchers agree, but based on rather limited empirical evidence, that the stability ofmentalmodels is a problemwhenmanagers
face environmental change. Empirical evidence for a cognitive explanation for organizational inertia in the face of change has been
found in several contexts. GrØnhaug and Falkenberg (1989) were amongst the ﬁrst to investigate changes in strategywhen ﬁrms ex-
perience environmental jolts. The authors attributed the lack of change they found to biased management perceptions of their envi-
ronments and a lack of competencies in dealing with new conditions.
Other empirical studies have also identiﬁed cognitive inﬂuences on inertia based on longitudinal documentary evidence (Barr
et al., 1992), longitudinal questionnaire evidence (Hodgkinson, 1997) and in-depth cognitive interviews (Reger & Palmer, 1996).
These studies highlight disastrous consequences for ﬁrms when leaders become locked into mental models that are no longer appro-
priate for new conditions. This problem is not easily resolved because mental models have been found to change slowly even when
environments change rapidly (Reger & Palmer, 1996).
In another study by Lindell et al. (1998), based on longitudinal documentary evidence at an individual decision making level, re-
searchers found that a framework of strong stable beliefs, values and assumptions can prevail in an individual over long periods of
time (at least over the three-year term of the study). This stability, the authors suggest, may be based on those beliefs that are likely
to be formed early on in managers' careers. However, Lindell et al. (1998) also found continuous mental adaptation, but this was fo-
cused on situational factors. Evidence suggests that mental models can change due to experience, but once they have been built up
over time they remain stable and difﬁcult to change (Barr et al., 1992).
The study byMarkóczy (2001) provides one rare example of more detailed empirical evidence of changes to cognitive consensus
over timewithin individualmanagers as they grapplewith external change. The ﬁndings highlight that consensus increases over time
during strategic change but the locus of consensus was not foundwithin leaders in the top management team. The ﬁndings also sug-
gest that consensus building occurs due to a larger number of individuals that agree, rather than any alteration to the strength of
agreement. Such initial ﬁndings have led other researchers such asMumford et al. (2007) to theorizemore deeply about leaders' cog-
nition when ﬁrms face disruptive change and crises.
Descriptive and prescriptive mental models under crises
Based on cognitive vision formation theory developed by Mumford and Strange (2002), Mumford et al. (2007) provide a theoret-
ical grounded conceptual model to help explain how leaders address change and resolve crises over time. This model postulates that
the onset of a crisis would ﬁrst force leaders to activate descriptive mental models based on case based prior knowledge and experi-
ence as they confront ambiguous and novel problems (Eubanks & Mumford, 2010; Mumford et al., 2007). In other words, leaders
would initially use amentalmodel based on how their world is currently conﬁgured and operates to try tomake sense of what is hap-
pening. As these descriptive mental models are based on prior knowledge and experience individuals will likely produce different in-
terpretations of any external change and its impact on the ﬁrm (Mumford et al., 2007). Leaders would then develop a prescriptive
mental model over time as the basis of a vision formation process for the future to overcome any crisis (Mumford & Strange, 2002;
Mumford et al., 2007; Strange & Mumford, 2005).
Currently, empirical evidence for this theory is rather limited. Strange andMumford (2002) report a study based on documentary
evidencewhich found that it is indeed the content, in terms of goals and causes, that was keywhen determining a prescriptivemental
model as a basis for vision formation in historical charismatic and ideological leaders. Strange and Mumford (2005) report a further
experimental studywhich conﬁrms the importance of descriptivementalmodels based on past experience and the abstraction of key
goals and causes for vision formation. Both these studies focus on the analysis of visionary statements of leaders rather than theirmen-
tal models.
Consequently there is an express need, as Strange andMumford (2005) report, formore direct longitudinal studies focusing on the
changes to mental models which underlie leaders' vision formation in crises. Currently, theory implies that leaders near the start of a
crisis will draw on different case-based prior knowledge and experience so there is an expectation that considerable cognitive diver-
sity will be present even within leaders within the same ﬁrm as they confront a crisis. This insight leads to the following working
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Near the start of a disruptive external change and subsequent crisis cognitive diversity will be apparent in managers
adopting leadership roles.
Cognitive diversity will be demonstrated by differences in objectives, means or strategies to achieve objectives and other causal
beliefs represented in themental models of managers adopting leadership roles within the same ﬁrm as they address the same crisis.
Later, as the crisis develops and the impact of the disruptive change becomes clearer, problems are likely to be addressed and start
to be resolved. When responding to a crisis, theory suggests that cognitive consensus is likely because managers gradually create
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lowing working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. When responding to a crisis cognitive consensus will emerge over time in managers adopting leadership roles.
Cognitive consensus will be demonstrated by increasing similarities in objectives, means or strategies to achieve objectives and
other causal beliefs represented in the mental models of managers adopting leadership roles within the same ﬁrm as they address
the same crisis.
As part of this developing consensus, some leaders are likely to change their mental models more than others. Prior research sug-
gests that this changemay be due to a number of factors. For example, leadersmay initially apply prior case based knowledge but this
knowledge may not help in the current crisis. There is likely to be errors of judgment initially when confronting ambiguous events.
These may be resolved by communication with other leaders within the ﬁrm and by additional information on important aspects
of the disruptive change. Consequently, there is an expectation for the following:
Hypothesis 3. When developing cognitive consensus some leaders will change their mental models more than other leaders.
Change tomentalmodelswill be demonstrated by changes to objectives,means or strategies to achieve objectives and other causal
beliefs represented in themental models of managers adopting leadership roles within the same ﬁrm as they address the same crisis.
These working hypotheses will be investigated and developed in the empirical phase of the research.
Method
To contribute to the literature on leaders' sensemaking under crises this current studywas designed to investigate similarities and
differences in beliefs and values at an individual level over time (Bougon, Weick, & Binkhorst, 1977; Markóczy, 1997; Wacker, 1981;
Walsh, 1988;Weick, 1979). This research agenda did not allow us to use documentary evidencewhich has been used as a longitudinal
data source in some prior studies (e.g. Barr et al., 1992; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007). Documents such as let-
ters to shareholders assume leaders' consensus and do not highlight individual differences in cognition. Instead, multiple data collec-
tion techniqueswere usedwithin single case studymethod (see Yin, 2014). Thismethod allowed the investigation of different leaders'
cognition within the same organizational context, including different responses to the same crisis.
The case study ﬁrm and context
The empirical research was conducted within a single not-for-proﬁt organization anonymously named ‘Health Change UK’which
operates in the health sector in the United Kingdom.
Sample
Cognitive consensus and diversity as well as changes to mental models were investigated within all the leadership teams and
included 12 leaderswithin the organizationwhichhas approximately 200 employees. The respondents consisted of all 4 topmanagers
(TM) i.e. all of the topmanagement team including the CEO; 2 trustees (TR) including the chair of trustees and the treasurerwho both
act as non-executive directors on the board; 6 regional leaders operating at middle management level (MM) within the branch
network.
As the purpose of the research is to understand leaders' cognition when facing a crisis, it is essential to provide the detailed re-
search context for the study. Therefore, we start by outlining the crisis that ‘Health Change UK’ faced in 2011 at the start of this
research.
‘Health Change UK’, and many other similar providers in health services in the U.K., have sourced large amounts of their funding
from various government contracts via taxpayers' money. The main government department having overall responsibility for this
funding has been the Department of Health within the U.K. Government. A large majority of these contracts were commissioned
via the National Health Service Primary Care Trusts (NHS PCTs). For many years contract commissioners' requirements within Trusts
have remained stable and speciﬁc contracts have rolled over based on the satisfaction of the work. However, due to changes in the
external political environment in 2010, the funding and tendering process for these contracts altered signiﬁcantly based on the
plans put forward by a new U.K. Government (Department of Health, 2010).
The new government introducedmajor changes to public services. Themost signiﬁcant changes related to the proposals to reform
the healthcare system. Under the plans, general practitioners (doctors in local surgeries at the front line) would be given muchmore
responsibility for spending the budget. There were also plans to increase competition so the use of the private sector and third
(voluntary) sector was to be encouraged. It has been dubbed one of the most radical plans in the history of the health service in
the U.K. and has been very controversial.
Many of the current government's policies are argued to be necessary to combat both the economic crisis of the global recession
and also to reduce the nation's large budget deﬁcit. In the Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010 it was apparent that efﬁciency
savings would be required from all areas of public funding and also some budgets would face dramatic cuts. As a result of these re-
forms ‘Health Change UK’ were facing some very uncertain times as they were not sure how the funding environment was going
to change.
312 I.A. Combe, D.J. Carrington / The Leadership Quarterly 26 (2015) 307–322However, therewasmore certainty about onemajor change that was fundamental for the ﬁnancial viability of ‘Health Change UK’.
Commissioners of health services were required to ensure that there was competitive tendering on all contracts and that there was a
transparency on the performance of service providers. Theywere to ensure that the principle of payment by results (money following
service performance) was enshrined in future commissioning of health services. Consequently, competition for ‘Health Change UK’
increased dramatically with much larger organizations competing directly with them on tendering for health services. Some of
these larger organizations had signiﬁcant economies of scale and introduced lower price competition into the health sector which
meant that the continued existence of ‘Health Change UK’ was questioned. It was this threat and the subsequent crisis due to the
loss of large contracts that the organization was facing at the start of the research.
Data collection
To triangulate the data, an interviewprotocolwith different stageswas developed to include a variety of data collection techniques
to support the investigation of leaders' cognition. For the ﬁrst phase all 12 interviewswere conducted over a two-month period by the
same researcher using an identical interview protocol in each case. The same data collection procedure was followed for the second
phase of data collection 18 months later. Due to the need to compare leaders' cognition we used sorting technique, common in psy-
chological research (Rosenberg, 1982), as the basis of the standardized procedure for developing cognitive maps outlined by
Markóczy and Goldberg (1995). The essence of the technique is that a large identical pool of factors is consistently presented to a va-
riety of respondents for them to sort out which are the most important. This technique is used to standardize the production of cog-
nitive maps which is vital when they are to be compared and contrasted.
Pilot stage and designing the pool of factors
The pool of factors that represented individuals' beliefs about the organization and its environment were derived from the litera-
ture (Buzzell, Gale, & Sultan, 1975; Combe, Rudd, Leeﬂang, & Greenley, 2012; Hambrick, 1981;Markóczy, 2001;Markóczy &Goldberg,
1995; Miles, 1980; Walsh, 1988) and also adapted through pilot interviews with six employees of the company. This pilot was de-
signed to investigate management cognition at all levels of the organization, so managers representative of different organizational
levels were included. The Business Development Manager who regularly attends board meetings represented the views of the top
management team as we wanted to include all individuals for this group in the main study. These six individuals were not part of
themain study but this small scale evaluation helped test the validity and robustness of the interview protocol and explored different
meanings of the factors included in the sorting task.
The main problem highlighted in this pilot study was the terminology used for the factors in the sorting task. They were based on
prior research in the proﬁt sector so did not apply completely to the health related not-for-proﬁt case study ﬁrm. Therefore, theword-
ing of some factors had to be altered to a more commonly accepted language used in this health sector. As no further modiﬁcations
were required 54 factors were promoted to be used in the main study. During each interview in the main study all participants
were offered the chance to write down any additional factors they believed were important to the success of their organization but
no one contributed any further factors.
Interviews using multiple data collection methods
All the face-to-face interviews with the managers adopting leadership roles included four stages using multiple data collection
techniques.
Stage 1 All interviews were initiated by using sorting technique as a starting point to the development of causal cognitive maps fol-
lowing the standardized procedure outlined byMarkóczy andGoldberg (1995). This technique is used to standardize the pro-
duction of cognitive maps and is also used to reduce interview bias because there is no communication between researcher
and respondent during the sorting process (Walsh, 1988). Sorting technique is designed to identify each participant's beliefs
about important factors for success so a standard aim is introduced in each interview; that of factors ‘important or not impor-
tant for the success of the organization’.
Stage 2 After the sorting task each respondentwas asked to rank order the tenmost important factors for success (rank order 1 for the
most important to rank order 10 for the least important) and these ten factors were used to generate cognitive maps in real
time during the rest of the interview. This approach was taken, as it is possible to verify the accuracy of the cognitive maps
produced by the participants during the interviews and it alleviates the need for any post hoc interpretation by the researcher
(see Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004). Production of cognitive maps during the interview also ensures that the elicitation
task is meaningful to participants (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008).
Stage 3 The cognitive mapping procedure was then followed by an in-depth interview to develop a more detailed understanding.
Each participant was asked to explain each factor chosen and the links within each cognitive map before laddering was
used to investigate antecedents and consequences of a focus on any particular factor (Gutman, 1982; Reynolds & Gutman,
1988).
Additionally, at the end of the interviews for the second phase, participants were presented with their cognitive maps from
phase 1. The interviewer then asked the respondents to discuss any similarities and differences over the intervening period.
From the 24 interviews (both phases) a total of 157 A4 pages of transcriptions were produced.
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role, location of work, time spent at the company and objectives for the company.Analysis and results
To investigate similarities and differences in beliefswithin the organization, individual differences between pairs ofmapswere an-
alyzed (see Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995). This provided a statistical value between individual maps so each participant's cognitive
map was individually compared to the other 11 participants. Following Markóczy and Goldberg (1995), if a value of 0 is present
then the maps are exactly identical whereas a value of 1 represents a completely different cognitive map. A zero value is nearly im-
possible because this represents identical causal cognitive maps where all 10 factors and all cause–effect beliefs are the same. It is
only evident on the matrix when compared with the participants' own map. The value of 1 can be quite common and occurs several
times in the dataset as various participants chose a completely different set of 10 factors to another participant (see Table 1).
Cognitive diversity
Table 1 presents the data near the start of the crisis. There are considerable differences in the factors chosen by the various leaders
to achieve success indicating that their objectives are different as are their strategies or ‘means’ to achieve their objectives. Of partic-
ular interest are the clear differenceswithin the topmanagement team (TM01− TM04)withhigh scores for cognitive differences. For
example, the difference between TM02 and TM03 is 1 (maximum) indicating that two leaders within a small top teamhave chosen a
completely different set of factors as important for success.
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was applied to the dataset to provide an initial overview of the whole data. The settings were
modiﬁed using ‘PROXSCAL’ with ‘Proximities = Dissimilarities’, ‘Proximity Transformations = Interval’ and ‘Initial
Conﬁguration = Torgerson’. The stress values in our study were found to be quite high (S-Stress = 0.14) but expected due to the
complexities around dimensionality when analyzing this type of dataset (Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995). This technique allowed the
data to be presented in two-dimensional space so that the positioning of respondents with respect to each other could be evaluated
indicating similarities and differences in their cognitive maps (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 indicates wide differences between the cognitive maps of the leaders. Of particular interest is the considerable differences
and lack of cognitive consensus within the leadership as a whole and particularly within the top management team and trustees,
all of whom sit on the same board of directors. From the laddering interview transcripts it was apparent that at the beginning of
the crisis the leaders had divergent perspectives on the disruptive external change and its implications for the organization. Despite
there being a general consensus regarding the nature of the change, which had implications for the way the company needed to
operate, sensemaking appeared very idiosyncratic. The leaders themselves focused on different aspects of their environments. This
focus ranged from concentrating on their competitors as in the case of a member of the top team (TM01) to other aspects such asTable 1
Matrix for comparing individual's cognitive maps from phase 1.
TM01 TM02 TM03 TM04 TR01 TR02 MM01 MM02 MM03 MM04 MM05 MM06
TM01 0.000
TM02 0.971 0.000
TM03 0.686 1.000 0.000
TM04 0.784 0.809 0.889 0.000
TR01 0.705 0.689 0.889 0.587 0.000
TR02 0.971 0.797 0.814 0.889 0.971 0.000
MM01 0.971 0.439 0.912 0.805 0.903 1.000 0.000
MM02 0.515 0.903 0.822 0.705 0.754 0.971 0.971 0.000
MM03 1.000 0.889 0.898 0.822 0.771 0.784 0.898 0.903 0.000
MM04 0.903 0.771 0.667 0.907 0.805 0.814 0.784 0.839 0.801 0.000
MM05 0.903 0.971 0.818 0.780 0.670 0.889 0.805 0.809 0.775 0.780 0.000
MM06 0.735 0.889 0.814 0.537 0.788 1.000 0.570 0.835 0.889 0.784 0.670 0.000
Average = 0.813
TM01–04 TR01–02 MM01–06
Mean 0.856 0.971 0.808
Median 0.849 0.971 0.805
Max 1.000 0.971 0.971
Min 0.686 0.971 0.570
Range 0.314 0.000 0.401
SD 0.119465 # 0.096514
TM — Top manager (member of the Top Management Team).
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Fig. 1.MDS of comparing the maps of participants in phase 1.
314 I.A. Combe, D.J. Carrington / The Leadership Quarterly 26 (2015) 307–322the government, funders (contract commissioners), staff, new markets, strategic alliances, or cost cutting. The following quotations
highlighted these contrasting perspectives.“I think we should look at all our competitors…people that we constantly come up against with tenders and we do need to be
looking to see what they're doing and how we can do what they're doing a bit better or more cheaply.” TM01“I think the change of government has brought about immense changes in the way that government impacts upon services…
they've put in place a framework that determines whowill do that and how they will do it…government policy in the current
environment is integral to everything we do.” TM02“If we don't get sufﬁcient funding just to keep the service going, then obviously we can't offer anything…suddenly the external
world has hit us…how do wemotivate staff so they don't just think that we're pushing them to do targets, targets, targets; ac-
tually we're also looking after them.” TM03“I think trustees sometimes feel very frightened about moving into new areas of work…I understand their reluctance, but for
me it feels crucial for us to be able to thrive in a marketplace that's becoming more and more difﬁcult.” TM04“Sometimes you're going to see beneﬁts in partnering with somebody else, sometimes as senior partner, sometimes as junior
partner…it's probably less risky to do that — to recognize your own limitations and to work alongside somebody else.” TR01“The fact that theworld is changing aroundus all the time. The funding is uncertain…whenpeople are under threat they ‘hunker
down’ and sort of get set in their ways kind of thing, whereas organizationally we have constantly to be ready to change.” TR02“It's howyou then structure an organization, isn't it? If you've got to do cost-cutting, then that has an effect, doesn't it?What do
you cut? Is it stafﬁng and how do you deliver that and how does that affectmorale for example? And I think that's quite a com-
plex one to deal with really.”MM01“Last year I've seen so much change…than in the whole of my working profession… the support from head ofﬁce to translate
what funders want is really critical… The way that one communicates really has an effect on whether staff want to go along
with what's changing or not.”MM03In summary, the data indicate that in phase 1 of the interviews considerable cognitive diversity existed in the leadership as awhole
and evenwithin each leadership team. Considerable differences were found in the cognitivemaps of the leaders highlighting alterna-
tive focus of issues of importance as well as different objectives and strategies or means to achieve them. The ﬁndings support
Hypothesis 1.
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Next,wewanted to assess any changes to individuals'mentalmodels as the crisis progressed. Therefore,we analyzed the cognitive
maps based on the factors contained in the cognitive maps and the causal relationships between them during phases 1 and 2. To
provide a more detailed analysis, the standard method of calculating in-degrees (or the number of links leading into a factor) and
out-degrees (or the number of links leading out of a factor) for all factors in all the cognitive maps was used (see Bougon et al.,
1977). Calculating the in-degrees of the different factors helped identify the objectives or end states and also the ‘means’ or strategies
respondents believed the best way to achieve these objectives. Additionally, the frequency of chosen concepts and the accumulated
rank order was collated. To keep a simpliﬁed scoring system a conventional ordinal ranking model was used (Cook & Kress, 1985)
but without any intensity of preference (so 1st = 10pts to 10th = 1 pt).3 The etiographic representations and accumulated rank
order scores for phases 1 and 2 are represented in Table 2.
Table 2 indicates the changes in objectives in the leadership as awhole between phases 1 and 2 of the data collection. The following
objectives have becomemuchmore important to the leadership as awhole as the crisis has progressed: ‘Service quality’, ‘Motivation of
staff’, ‘Relationships with partners’ and ‘Innovative services’. ‘Service quality’ in particular is considerably more important in phase 2
moving from an in-degree score of 43 and a rank order score of 44 in phase 1 to 125 and 90 respectively in phase 2 (see Table 2).
These increases indicate that ‘Service quality’ and its improvement is seenmuchmore widely by the leadership as the most important
objective for the organization. This increasing consensus towards a focus on improving service quality and the importance of staff mo-
tivation is reﬂective of trial and error learning based on losing contracts and tendering for new contracts. Considerable change, such as
improving the tenderingprocesswas required to subsequently resolve the ﬁnancial crisis. Tenderingwas improved by collatingdata on
past successes, such as on patient improvement and demonstrating efﬁciency savings, and quoting this data in new tender documents.
Table 2 also indicates other factors have moved up the agenda in the leadership as a whole such as the factors representing the
increased importance on analysis of data such as ‘Detailed information/data on customers’ and ‘Detailed analysis of company ﬁ-
nances’. Other factors also increased in importance as the crisis progressed such as ‘Developing staff’ and ‘Employee ﬂexibility’ that
impact on improving service quality.
The focus on attempting to resolve the organizational crisis following the disruptive change is also evident in other data. In phase 1
only three leaders chose ‘Responsibility to commissioners’ (the fund holders) as an important factor. However, by phase 2 this stake-
holder is discussed muchmore widely. Additionally, by phase 2, ‘Competition’ is discussed just as often but it has moved from a dia-
logue of the unknown to the known with speciﬁc competitors named in discussions. A major theme that came out of the in-depth
laddering interviews in phase 2 was the increased chaos produced within the organization by losing contracts and the subsequent
learning that occurred. In accordance with the sensemaking literature these discussions were framed retrospectively (Weick,
1995). The following quotations from leaders highlight this retrospective sensemaking.3 A si
change“XXX (Service A— 55%of turnover)was tanking seriously (experiencing signiﬁcant problems) and…peoplewere really unhap-
py whereas I think nowwe've been through the pain of the restructure…losing XXX (Service B— 21% of turnover), losing XXX
(Service C — 6% of turnover), big wake up calls for the staff.” TM01“I think that 12 months ago ‘Health Change UK’was a different organization. It was slightly myopic and didn't have much of a
sense of what its competitors were up to and we lost contracts…I think now we've got a good appreciation of what our com-
petitors do and how they compete.” TM02“I was still feeling the ricochet of the fallout from losing the XXX (Service B) contract actually and we were in a bit of a state of
anxiety around that…last year has seen us win new contracts…it's allayed those anxieties.” TM03“In the world that we live in currently with competitive tendering if we're not good value wewon't get the tender....if our price
differential is too greatwewon't even get anywhere close…So forme knowingwhat competitors' prices are and knowingwhat
our prices are is absolutely crucial.” TM04“I thinkwe have learnt that the amount of change thatwe've gotmeanswe needmore resource in the sense of in head ofﬁce, in
the sort of senior (top)management group…So where we were previously doing the same thing in lots of different places you
could have a fairly light touch management.” TR01“We lost XXX (Service B), we got thingswrong in XXX (Service C).We've had to spread our boundaries…a year agoweweren't
in XXX (Service D — 2% of turnover), we weren't in XXX (Service E — 4% of turnover), we weren't in XXX (Service F — 19% of
turnover)…the committee (board of directors) has certainly become much more aware of it's a new world.” TR02“The sense I've got iswe'remore aware of, as it were, fragility. I thinkwe're farmore in a competitivemarket. I think that's had a
rocky start on various occasions, but we've won some large contracts and lost some large contracts as well. I thinkwe've learnt
pretty rapidly.”MM01mple scoring system allowed the comparison of the highest to lowest ranked factors between phases 1 and 2. A change in the ranking is assumed to indicate a
in the importance of a particular factor as the crisis developed.
Table 2
Etiographic representations and accumulated rank order scores for phases 1 and 2.
Phase 1 ID Rk Phase 2 ID Rk
Helping clients achieve ‘recovery’ 87 52 Service quality 125 90
Target focused 64 38 Helping clients achieve ‘recovery’ 60 50
Planning ahead 54 26 Motivation of staff 58 55
Service quality 43 44 Relationships with partners 45 40
Relationships with partners 41 28 Innovative services 31 18
Supporting clients with their problems 37 14 Target focused 28 31
Accessibility 36 10 Responsibility to funders/commissioners 27 46
Employee relationships 35 29 Targeting new funders 25 12
Targeting new funders 33 25 Detailed information/data on customers 20 8
Barriers to change within the organization 32 28 Responsibility to trustees 19 12
Motivation of staff 31 34 Measuring customer achievements 17 25
Internal efﬁciency 26 17 Internal efﬁciency 17 26
Innovative services 25 19 Response speed to change in customers' needs 17 11
Learning to improve 24 5 Developing staff 17 19
Competitor analysis 23 7 Planning ahead 14 18
Differentiation of services from competitors 22 14 Employee ﬂexibility 13 13
Open communication 21 14 Detailed analysis of company ﬁnances 13 12
Measuring customer achievements 19 15 Level of funding 12 20
Shared corporate culture 18 11 Accessibility 11 16
Responsibility to funders/commissioners 15 24 Learning to improve 9 2
Control of service costs 15 20 Building resources for the future 7 5
Company brand image 14 22 Promoting the service 6 10
Price differentiation from competitors 13 20 Employee relationships 6 9
Support from head ofﬁce 13 15 Knowledge of competitors 4 8
Level of funding 12 26 Knowledge of customers 4 8
Knowledge of customers 9 10 Price differentiation from competitors 4 18
Employee ﬂexibility 8 9 Differentiation of services from competitors 4 6
Building resources for the future 8 14 Supporting clients with their problems 4 3
Personal motivation 8 10 Competitor analysis 4 12
Taking risks in decision making 7 1 Government policy 3 10
Knowledge of internal operations 6 4 Company brand image 3 5
Developing staff 6 15 Shared corporate culture 3 9
Government policy 4 20 Control of service costs 3 7
Cooperation across all departments 4 1 Open communication 2 9
Promoting the service 4 1 Barriers to change within the organization 0 3
Current resources 2 3 Economic conditions 0 7
Detailed information/data on customers 0 8 Taking risks in decision making 0 5
Range of extra services 0 4 Support from head ofﬁce 0 2
Geographical position of services 0 2 Cooperation across all departments 0 0
Response speed to change in customers' needs 0 1 Current resources 0 0
Detailed analysis of company ﬁnances 0 0 Geographical position of services 0 0
Economic conditions 0 0 Knowledge of internal operations 0 0
Knowledge of competitors 0 0 Personal motivation 0 0
Responsibility to trustees 0 0 Range of extra services 0 0
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were recovering from and then we had the XXX (Service A) change…XXX (Service B), XXX (Service A) and XXX (Service C),
that's a huge learning curve in one year.”MM03In summary, the crisis at the organization caused by a reduction in funding and changes to competitive tendering meant that
‘Health Change UK’was questioning its ﬁnancial viability. The commissioners supplying the contracts were seen as increasingly im-
portant so the leadership was ﬁnding out what was needed to be successful in a new competitive landscape. By phase 2 of the data
collection the leadership had learned about its new competitors and had taken steps to improve its service quality. They had also be-
come much more effective at competitive tendering. Consequently, the organization had retained some contracts and added some
new ones. The sensemaking and learning that occurred over time resulted in increased cognitive consensus by phase 2.
We used another form of analysis to compare the leadership as a whole over the two phases. The analysis listed in Table 3 dem-
onstrates the number ofmapped factors and the number of links between the factorswithin each cognitivemap. Additionally, the link
density for mapped nodes shows the number of links divided by the number of mapped factors (see Eden, Ackermann, & Cropper,
1992). Similarly, the absolute link strength density for mapped nodes exhibits the sum of all link strengths divided by the number
of mapped factors (see Langﬁeld-Smith & Wirth, 1992). Map Density for Mapped Nodes — The number of links divided by the
theoretical number of maximum links between mapped factors (number of mapped factors ∗ number of mapped factors− 1) (see
Hart, 1976). These scores are important to investigate issues such as cognitive complexity and focus within cognitive maps.
Table 3 indicates a reduction in cognitive complexity as cognitive consensus emerged. Of particular signiﬁcance is the reduction in
the number of links between factors important for success and the reduction in link strength. The reduction in these two measures
Table 3
Additional analysis comparing the cognitive maps from phase 1 to phase 2.
Phase 1 Phase 2
Number of mapped factors 40 38
Number of links 274 202
Total link strength 797 553
Total ABS link strength 819 635
Link density for mapped nodes 6.85 5.32
Link strength density for mapped nodes 19.93 14.55
Link ABS strength density for mapped nodes 20.48 16.71
Map density for mapped nodes 0.18 0.14
Note: ‘ABS link strength’ is absolute link strength ignoring positive and negative in the causal relationships.
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nization in the later phase of sensemakingwhen attempting to resolve the crisis. In this second phase the leaders became less focused
on external issues and more focused on internal issues as their response to the crisis took shape.
Additionally, the movement towards cognitive consensus over the course of the crisis is further supported in Table 4.
Table 4 presents the data of comparing the similarities and differences in individual cognitive maps (Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995)
18 months later. While there are still some high scores for cognitive differences there is also somemovement to cognitive consensus.
For example, the difference between TM02 and TM03hasmoved frommaximumdistance value of 1.00 in phase 1 to a value of 0.541 in
phase 2 indicating a considerablemovement to cognitive consensus and agreement on some factors for achieving success. In diagram-
matic terms the dimensionality (distance ratio) has narrowed in the cognitivemaps of the leadership as awhole as canbe seen in Fig. 2.
In summary, there was an expectation, but based on limited prior longitudinal cognitive research, that wewould ﬁnd a narrowing
in the dimensionality in common space maps indicating more cognitive consensus due to sensemaking over time as the crisis
progressed (Figs. 1 and 2 taken together highlight this to an extent). The ﬁndings, therefore, support Hypothesis 2 to some extent.
However, while consensus increased slightly in the leadership as a whole, much more consensus was evident within the three
leadership teams as the responses to the crisis developed. This ﬁnding is contrary to Markóczy (2001) who found that there was
no increased consensus within the top management teamwhen studying the development of cognitive consensus within individual
ﬁrms as they responded to change.We found an increase in the similarities of objectives and strategies (ormeans) to achieve them as
well as other cause–effect beliefs in the cognitive maps of the leaders within each well-deﬁned leadership team. Cognitive diversity
was reduced within the top management team, within trustees (non-executive directors) and within middle managers (regional
leaders). As our ﬁndings run contrary to prior research we discuss the possible explanations for our ﬁndings and their implications
in the discussion section below.
Changes in cognition from phases 1 and 2 (18 months)
We have already discussed some of the changes to the cognitive maps of the leaders over time (18 months), such as a movement
to cognitive consensus on themain objectives (see Table 2 and discussion). However, we have not compared each complete cognitiveTable 4
Matrix for comparing individual's cognitive maps from phase 2.
TM01 TM02 TM03 TM04 TR01 TR02 MM01 MM02 MM03 MM04 MM05 MM06
TM01 0.000
TM02 0.809 0.000
TM03 0.550 0.541 0.000
TM04 0.903 0.731 0.593 0.000
TR01 0.678 0.792 0.678 0.898 0.000
TR02 0.792 0.971 0.797 0.917 0.667 0.000
MM01 0.797 0.716 0.716 0.580 0.912 0.917 0.000
MM02 0.784 0.497 0.560 0.477 0.912 0.917 0.583 0.000
MM03 0.907 0.705 0.797 0.898 0.907 0.826 0.674 0.587 0.000
MM04 0.797 0.689 0.792 0.712 0.898 0.814 0.797 0.670 0.670 0.000
MM05 0.898 0.577 0.419 0.814 0.889 0.670 0.797 0.424 0.570 0.655 0.000
MM06 0.971 0.809 0.822 0.630 0.889 0.689 0.652 0.465 0.678 0.801 0.678 0.000
Average = 0.726
TM01–04 TR01–02 MM01–06
Mean 0.688 0.667 0.647
Median 0.662 0.667 0.670
Max 0.903 0.667 0.801
Min 0.541 0.667 0.424
Range 0.362 0.000 0.376


























0.0 0.5 1.0-1.0 -0.5
Fig. 2.MDS of comparing the maps of participants in phase 2.
318 I.A. Combe, D.J. Carrington / The Leadership Quarterly 26 (2015) 307–322map for the leaders from phases 1 and 2. Table 5 provides the values for each individual's mapwhen each map is compared between
phase 1 and phase 2 using the same MDS technique.
The data indicate that large changes have occurred to the cognitive maps of nearly all the leaders in the organization. Only two
middle managers (regional leaders MM01 and MM05) show low scores for cognitive differences and therefore only the cognitive
maps of these two leaders were relatively stable between phases 1 and 2. The ﬁndings, therefore, support Hypothesis 3.
Discussion
Before outlining the conclusions and discussing the possible fruitful areas for future research arising from the present study we
ﬁrst discuss the limitations.
The ﬁndings are based on a single in-depth case study when leaders confront a single crisis. Therefore, the study offers little in the
way of generalization. A limitation of case study research is that it allows the ﬁndings to be used for theory building or discussed in
relation to theory only (analytical generalization). This limitation, however, is balanced by the advantage that case study method
can provide a deep understanding of leaders' cognition under crisis in a naturalistic setting. As the context is so important for under-
standing leaders' cognition under crises we feel that case study research has a lot to offer this emerging domain.
The use of causal cognitive mapping is a technique with known limitations. Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002), for example, report
that the type of errors to be expected is related to the technique used to generate themaps. The hand drawnmapping technique used
in this study as amodiﬁcation to the standardmethod outlined byMarkóczy andGoldberg (1995) has advantages and limitations. The
main advantage is that the respondents draw the maps themselves in real time which is likely to be more accurate than post hoc
drawing by the researcher. The main limitation is that the hand drawn method puts particular demands on the respondents' recall
memory and is therefore likely to provide some inaccuracies in the representation of individuals' beliefs.
It is difﬁcult to determinewhether all the changes to cognitivemaps represent learning how to respond to the crisis as the basis of
vision formation or whether changes to maps highlight initial errors of judgment. We suggest that future research could tackle this
issue by additional data collection using an experimental research phase. Experimental researchmethods are well developed inman-
agement cognition research and these methods could be used in conjunction with the data collection techniques used in this study,
such as cognitive mapping, to explore the inﬂuence of errors in more detail.
Limited changes to cognitivemaps could highlight a time delaywhich is a form of error identiﬁed as contributing to inertia in prior
research (Barr et al., 1992). The longitudinal research reported in this current study included two phases of data collection separated
by 18 months. There are some advantages to this research design, such as allowing enough time for changes to take place but withoutTable 5
Comparison of individual's change in cognitive maps from phase 1 to phase 2.
TM01 TM02 TM03 TM04 TR01 TR02 MM01 MM02 MM03 MM04 MM05 MM06
0.889 0.659 0.686 0.553 0.788 0.889 0.376 0.597 0.674 0.693 0.328 0.550
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would have been beneﬁcial. Our ﬁndings point to the slow development in cognitive consensus towards a prescriptive mental
model for the future. Therefore, additional data collection phases would likely have contributed to additional insights into this slow
development. We note that additional phases of data collection could also have contributed to further understanding of how much
cognitive consensus is likely within the leadership as a whole when responding to a crisis.
We did not focus on the communication of vision in statements from leaders to followers. Analysis of documentary evidence and
attending staff meetings, in conjunction with cognitive mapping of both leaders and followers, may help in understanding the artic-
ulation of a prescriptive mental model for the future in more detail. Currently, we do not know howmany of the ‘new’ objectives and
cause–effect beliefs were articulated to followers and in what form. Given the cognitive diversity between the leadership as a whole,
perhaps the CEO articulated a single vision based on oneway forward (their own) to resolve the crisis, or possibly delayed articulation
due to this lack of consensus. Modifying the research design to include additional data would help clarify the links between leaders'
mental models and the articulation of a vision to resolve a crisis.
When considering the main contributions emerging from our empirical study we highlight the following. First, prior longitudinal
research on leaders' cognition largely assumes consensus because evidence is drawn from organizational level documentary evidence
(e.g. Barr et al., 1992). This approach has several weaknesses. It underplays the importance of sensemaking in individuals and ignores
individual differences that can occur within teams of leaders. An understanding of cognitive diversity and consensus within the lead-
ership is important for a deep understanding of organizational responses to disruptive change and crises. Given the ﬁndings, assuming
consensus in leaders within ﬁrms may be regarded as an assumption too far.
Second, the ﬁndings point to less cognitive diversity and more cognitive consensus within leaders as sensemaking occurs over
time. Evidence for an emerging viable prescriptive mental model for the future was found but in a way not expected from a review
of prior theory (Mumford et al., 2007) or empirical ﬁndings (Markóczy, 2001). Cognitive consensus occurred within well-deﬁned
leadership teamsmuch more than within the leadership as a whole. The ﬁndings point to emerging cognitive sub-cultures of leader-
shipwhen facing a crisis based on converging beliefswithin leadership teams but different beliefs between leadership teams even in a
single organization. The ﬁndings therefore lead to an additional hypothesis to be investigated by further research:
Hypothesis 2a. When responding to a crisis, cognitive consensus around a viable prescriptivementalmodel for the futurewill initial-
ly emerge within well-deﬁned leadership teams.
Third, we contribute data and analysis to comparewith the theoretically grounded conceptual model presented byMumford et al.
(2007) for investigating leaders' cognition under conditions of organizational crisis and change. Our data did not attempt to test or
address the complete conceptual model but the data allows some theoretical generalization by comparing our data with theory.
Our ﬁndings focus on two parts of the conceptual model only; the activation of descriptive mental models and the development of
a viable prescriptive mental model for the future.
When we compare our ﬁndings to the conceptual model presented byMumford et al. (2007) of particular signiﬁcance is the con-
siderable cognitive diversity within leaders as a whole when developing a viable prescriptive mental model for the future. Given the
time lapse since the crisis ﬁrst became apparent (well over 2 years before phase 2 of data collection) there were still considerable dif-
ferences in beliefs in how to achieve success within the new competitive landscape. Considering that a number of successful changes
had been implemented to deal with the crisis before stage 2 of the data collection, we ﬁnd this lack of consensus surprising. The data
implies that consensus over a viable prescriptive mental model occurs initially within teams of leaders but is problematic between
teams and there is little cognitive consensus when considering the leadership as a whole. Another possible explanation for our ﬁnd-
ings is that our data needs to take an even longer-term perspective on the development of a prescriptive mental model within the
leadership as a whole.
When comparing the data with the discussion of the conceptual model presented by Mumford et al. (2007), we conﬁrm the im-
portance of experiential and tacit knowledge to problem solving whenmaking sense of new conditions and the development of a vi-
able prescriptive mental model for the future. Of particular importance to the leaders in our case study organization was learning
about new competitors, and the services theywere offering, aswell as the new reality of competitive tendering. Learninghow contract
commissioners (fund holders) evaluated tenders in respect to competitors was key to this latter issue. Experiential knowledge, based
on both successes and failures in tendering for contracts, led to an improved tendering process. These improvements enabled the or-
ganization to obtain more new contracts and becomemore ﬁnancially viable. An improved success rate in competitive tendering re-
sulted in four new contracts equating to 30.8% of turnover following the original contract losses of 27.2% of turnover.
Fourth, the ﬁndings also conﬁrm that it was not the identiﬁcation of the crisis or change that was problematic for the leaders but
learning how to operate through trial and error in a new competitive landscape (see Barr et al., 1992). The two important issues of
note are the increased signiﬁcance of service quality and the importance of staffmotivation. The focus on these two issues is consistent
with some of the problems faced by the organization as a result of increased low price competition after government changes. The
organization had to improve its service delivery to justify its higher prices.
Fifth, the ﬁndings also conﬁrm that studying the locus of consensus is particularly important when understanding sensemaking
and an organizational response to change (Markóczy, 2001). Consensus is particularly important in leadership teams (Yammarino,
Mumford, Connelly, & Dionne, 2010). In contrast to Markóczy (2001), however, we found emerging consensus in all leadership
teams within the organization as the response to the crisis developed. This ﬁnding can be explained by the focus on a speciﬁc crisis
in the current study. Markóczy (2001) found consensuswithin a speciﬁc interest group that beneﬁted from change, but when in crisis
the implications for any speciﬁc interest group is likely to be unclear. When responding to more benign and gradual change, an
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ﬁndings in this case.
To add to deeper understanding future research should analyze the interaction within leadership teams to help understand more
fully how cognitive consensus is formed. Interactionwithin the leadership teams aswell aswith external stakeholders could inﬂuence
individuals to change their mental models. Communication between teammembers, both formally and informally, is likely to facili-
tate cross understanding and this is a possible explanation for our ﬁndings (see Huber & Lewis, 2010). We did not investigate com-
munication between leaders and the inﬂuence of dominant leaders on others so this may be a fruitful ﬁeld of research for the future.
Further studies could also look into the role of followers (other employees) in this context because of the differences found be-
tween leadership teams. It would be interesting to see if followers recognized the differences in the mental models within different
leadership teams as this may inﬂuence how they responded. Given our ﬁndings, an interesting question to investigate would be:
did followers agree with the analysis and future objectives put forward to resolve the crisis by one leadership team more than
another?
Another possible fruitful ﬁeld of research is into the inﬂuence of emerging consensus on individual performance, team perfor-
mance, and/or organizational performance. This research option is particularly important due to the cognitive differences foundwith-
in individuals and leadership teams in our study.
Finally, future research could be directed at the antecedents to any change and lack of change in the mental models of leaders as
they respond to a crisis.Mumford and Strange (2002) and Strange andMumford (2002) suggest an explanation for a lack of change to
mental models based on the style of leadership. Ideological leaders may be more likely to be consistent in their thinking even when
responding to a crisis so future research could explore this possible effect.
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